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Public Distribution System Reforms and 
Consumption in Chhattisgarh
A Comparative Empirical Analysis
Prasad Krishnamurthy, Vikram Pathania, Sharad Tandon
Chhattisgarh’s public distribution system reforms have 
been lauded as a model for the National Food Security 
Act, and as one that other states can emulate. Previous 
research has shown that PDS rice consumption increased 
in Chhattisgarh following reforms by the Raman Singh 
government, which began in 2004. However, one-third 
of PDS rice consumption growth in Chhattisgarh took 
place before 2004. This finding suggests that the 
pre-2004 reforms to fair price shop ownership and state 
procurement by the Ajit Jogi government contributed to 
PDS consumption growth. Our findings suggest that 
sustained reforms, when coupled with political and 
social will, can improve PDS access, and that 
improvements may not be substantial or sustained in 
the absence of these factors.
PDS Reforms: An Introduction
The National Food Security Act (NFSA) instantiates the present government’s commitment to expanding and possibly improving the public distribution system (PDS). 
The NFSA will dramatically increase the number of households 
eligible for PDS foodgrain rations. It also recommends a series of 
PDS reforms, including preferences for community organisations 
in administering fair price shops (FPSs), doorstep delivery of 
foodgrain, and public availability and computerisation of records. 
Over the past decade, several states have attempted to 
i ncrease PDS consumption by implementing similar reforms 
(Khera 2011a, 2011b). An empirical account of state-level 
r eforms is therefore valuable for assessing the likely effects of 
the NFSA. Chhattisgarh’s experience makes it an especially 
s alient case study. Beginning in 2004, the Raman Singh gov-
ernment introduced a series of major reforms to the delivery 
and procurement of PDS foodgrain. These include transferring 
FPSs to local bodies, providing below-poverty-line (BPL) r ations 
to more households, and reducing the PDS ration price.1
The Raman Singh government’s PDS reforms have been 
lauded as a model for the NFSA, and as one that other states 
can emulate (see, for example, The Economist 2012). Haryana 
and Punjab implemented pilot programmes based on Chhattis-
garh’s model (The Economic Times 2010). The Supreme Court 
demanded to know why Chhattisgarh could not serve as a 
model for the rest of the country (The Times of India 2013a). 
Following suit, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) called on the 
Congress to make the NFSA more like the Chhattisgarh Food 
Security Act by increasing coverage, rations, and subsidies 
(The Times of India 2013b).
In this article, we analyse the effect of PDS reforms in Chhat-
tisgarh on PDS rice consumption from 1999-2000 to 2009-2010 
by using districts that border Chhattisgarh, states that border 
Chhattisgarh, and the rest of India as comparison groups. 
A lthough prior studies have found an increase in PDS availabil-
ity in Chhattisgarh (Khera 2011a, 2011b; Puri 2012), Chhattis-
garh’s reforms have not been analysed relative to a plausible 
counterfactual. Such a comparison is required to differentiate 
the effect of Chhattisgarh’s reforms from broader regional or 
national patterns in PDS consumption. Border districts are a 
good comparison group because, as we show, the distribution 
of observable characteristics of households in these districts is 
nearly identical to that of Chhattisgarh in 1999-2000. 
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Table 1: Timeline of Major PDS Reforms in Chhattisgarh during 2000-10
 Year Reform Description
Instituted by Ajit Jogi 2001 Sarvajanik Nagrik Poorti Vitran Scheme Allowed private participation in the distribution of PDS commodities.
government (2000-03) 2002 Decentralised Procurement Scheme Allowed the state government to procure rice directly from farmers.
Instituted by Raman Singh  2004 Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2004 De-privatised FPSs and instituted a number of transparency/auditing
government (2004 onwards)   mechanisms for foodgrain distribution.
   Passed in December 2004.
   De-privatisation implemented starting September 2005 after legal
   challenge.
 2007 List price reduction Offered PDS foodgrain below the Central Issue Price.
 2007 Mukhyamantri Khadyann Sahayata Yojana Increased the number of people entitled to the most preferential PDS 
  Scheme  subsidies.
This table summarises reforms to the PDS in Chhattisgarh between 2000 and 2009-10.2  The top panel lists reforms instituted by the Ajit Jogi government; the bottom panel lists reforms 
instituted by the Raman Singh government. For reforms in border states, see Khera (2011a). 
Source: PDS articles in The Times of India and The Hindu between 1998 and 2011.
We make several contributions to the scholarly literature on 
PDS reforms. First, we provide a large-sample estimate of the 
effect of Chhattisgarh’s PDS reforms on PDS rice consumption. 
We fi nd that from 1999-2000 to 2009-10, the fraction of house-
holds in Chhattisgarh consuming any PDS rice increased by .3 
relative to border districts in states that did not undertake any 
PDS reforms. The number of calories of PDS rice consumed 
daily by households in Chhattisgarh increased by 900 relative 
to these border districts. 
Second, we fi nd that about one-third of Chhattisgarh’s PDS 
rice consumption growth from 1999-2000 to 2009-10 took 
place before 2004, the year of the Raman Singh government’s 
fi rst major reform. In contrast, there was little change in PDS 
rice consumption in comparison regions or in the other, newly-
formed states of Jharkhand and Uttarakhand prior to 2004. 
Moreover, more than 70% of Chhattisgarh’s growth in PDS rice 
consumption from 1999-2000 to 2009-10 – relative to border 
districts in states that undertook no major PDS reforms – took 
place prior to 2004. 
Third, we provide evidence that the increase in PDS rice con-
sumption in Chhattisgarh prior to 2004 was likely aided by 
r eforms undertaken by the Ajit Jogi government. Between 
2000 and 2004, the number of FPSs in Chhattisgarh and the 
amount of PDS rice procured directly by the Chhattisgarh gov-
ernment nearly doubled, while neither changed substantially 
in states bordering Chhattisgarh.
Fourth, we fi nd that subsequent to 2004, PDS rice consump-
tion growth in Chhattisgarh was similar to comparison regions 
that undertook no major PDS reforms. The Raman Singh gov-
ernment’s PDS reforms, which began in 2004, have been cred-
ited with much of Chhattisgarh’s success (Puri 2012). However, 
we estimate that at most one-third of PDS consumption growth 
in Chhattisgarh after 2004 can be attributed to these reforms.
Fifth, we identify a temporary fall in PDS rice consumption 
of about one-third immediately after Chhattisgarh discontin-
ued private FPS licences in 2004. This fall in PDS consumption 
is not shared by any of our comparison groups. This fi nding 
highlights the importance of ensuring the availability of 
r ations during policy transitions.
Our fi ndings do not imply that the PDS reforms of the R aman 
Singh government were ineffective. They do suggest that the 
factors we identify also contributed to PDS consumption 
growth in Chhattisgarh. These are important considerations 
in assessing the likely impact of the NFSA’s reforms, or similar 
reforms in other states.
PDS Reforms in Chhattisgarh and Border States
Chhattisgarh instituted a number of PDS reforms between 
1999-2000 and 2009-10, the years of our study. Table 1 
presents a timeline of reforms. We divide these reforms into 
those instituted by the Ajit Jogi government from 2000-03, 
and those instituted by the Raman Singh government from 
2004 onwards. 
Reforms between 2000 and 2004
Under the Ajit Jogi government, Chhattisgarh undertook two 
major PDS reforms before 2004. First, Chhattisgarh allowed 
private dealers to apply for licences to run FPSs. Second, Chhat-
tisgarh increased the amount of PDS rice that it procured 
d irectly from in-state farmers.
Figure 1:  Impacts of PDS Reforms in Chhattisgarh and Border States
The top panel of the figure presents the number of fair price shops (FPSs) per 1,000 people 
in Chhattisgarh and states bordering Chhattisgarh; and the bottom panel presents the 
average amount of PDS rice procured by the state government in Chhattisgarh and states 
bordering Chhattisgarh.
Source: All figures are obtained from Annual Reports published by the Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs and from the report “Programme Evaluation of Targeted Public 
Distribution System”, published by the Planning Commission in 2005.  Data on the FPSs and 
state PDS rice procurement is not available at the district level from these sources.  States 
that border Chhattisgarh are Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Odisha, and Uttar Pradesh.  
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The lack of access to FPSs is especially important in Chhat-
tisgarh, because it is predominantly rural. The top panel of 
Figure 1 (p 75) shows that in 2000, the number of FPSs per 
1,000 p eople in Chhattisgarh was less than half the number in 
border states. All FPSs in Chhattisgarh were operated by coop-
eratives at the time of its formation in 2000. According to the 
state government, these cooperatives were not in a fi nancial 
position to extend their coverage (Patnaik 2005). 
To improve FPS coverage, Chhattisgarh began to grant 
l icences to own and operate FPSs to private parties under the 
Sarvajanik Nagrik Poorti Vitran (SNPV) Scheme in June 2001. 
As a result of this reform, the number of FPSs in the state 
d oubled between 2001 and 2004. By 2004, there were 8,637 
total FPSs, of which 5,049 were privately owned.
Chhattisgarh also restructured its system of procurement 
for PDS rice. In 2002, Chhattisgarh began to participate in the 
decentralised procurement scheme (DCP), in which state gov-
ernments procure rice and wheat directly from local farmers 
at the minimum support price (MSP), and are reimbursed by 
the central government. The bottom panel of Figure 1 demon-
strates that from 2002-04, PDS rice procurement rose from just 
under one million metric tonnes to just under two million met-
ric tonnes, an increase of approximately 100%.
To the best of our knowledge, states with districts that share 
a border with Chhattisgarh did not undertake comparably 
comprehensive PDS reforms between 1999 and 2004.3 Com-
parative studies of PDS diversion that include this time period 
do not list reforms in these states (Khera 2011a, 2011b). Con-
sistent with this lack of reforms, Figure 1 shows that there was 
no noticeable change in FPS coverage in states that border 
Chhattisgarh, and that there was little change in PDS rice 
 procured by governments in these states.4 
Reforms between 2004 and 2010
Following the Raman Singh government’s ascendance to 
power in December 2003, the reform process in Chhattisgarh 
continued. The Raman Singh government passed its fi rst 
m ajor PDS legislation – the 2004 Public Distribution System 
(Control) Order – in December 2004. The Order discontinued 
the operation of FPSs by private dealers everywhere in the 
state, and permitted their operation only by Gram Panchayats, 
cooperative societies, self-help groups, and forest protection 
committees. This part of the Order provoked a legal challenge 
and was not implemented until the resolution of a Supreme 
Court case in September 2005 (Patnaik 2005).
The PDS (Control) Order contained a number of other re-
form provisions: delivery to FPSs should take place by the fi rst 
week of the month, allocation of grains to FPSs should be dis-
closed to gram panchayats and other local bodies, and inspec-
tions and social audits should take place within specifi ed inter-
vals. The government subsequently introduced measures to 
increase the fi nancial viability of FPSs by providing an interest-
free loan of Rs 75,000 for each FPS, and increasing the com-
mission on items sold from Rs 8 to Rs 45 per quintal. 
Under the Raman Singh government, Chhattisgarh also in-
creased the coverage of the PDS through the Mukhyamantri 
Khadyann Sahayata Yojana (MKSY) scheme. Launched in April 
2007, this scheme provided BPL rations to households that 
were BPL in the 1991 or 1997 BPL surveys, but were not BPL in 
the 2002 survey. This scheme increased the number of indi-
viduals eligible for the largest PDS subsidies by nearly two 
m illion (Puri 2012). Chhattisgarh also reduced PDS prices 
b elow the central issue price in 2007 (Dreze and Khera 2010). 
Chhattisgarh implemented a number of smaller reforms 
a fter 2004, including sending “SMS alerts” to report grain 
movements to citizens who registered to receive them; using 
electronic weighing machines for rations; visibly marking 
households to indicate their ration entitlement; and publicly 
displaying a list of all ration card holders at the FPS.5
Unlike the pre-2004 period, a number of states bordering 
Chhattisgarh began to implement similar PDS reforms between 
2004 and 2009-10. During this period, Andhra Pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh and Odisha reduced the price of PDS com-
modities below the central issue price (see, for example, Khera 
2011a).6 Khera (2011a) also provides a more complete descrip-
tion of reforms in other states.
Data and Estimation
We utilise data from the 55th (1999-2000), 61st (2004-05), and 
66th (2009-10) rounds of the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
conducted by the National Sample Survey Offi ce (NSSO). Each 
survey records a household’s consumption of rice obtained 
from the PDS over the previous 30 days. We calculate two dif-
ferent measures of PDS rice consumption: “PDS Rice Utilisa-
tion” is the share of households reporting any PDS rice con-
sumption; “PDS Rice Calories” is the total PDS rice calories 
c onsumed per household per day.7 We analyse PDS rice con-
sumption changes in Chhattisgarh over two separate periods: 
1999-2000 to 2004-05, and 2004-05 to 2009-2010. Rice is the 
staple foodgrain in the region, and other studies have found 
that PDS rice consumption is a better proxy for overall PDS 
c onsumption (Puri 2012).8 
Our estimation strategy compares changes in PDS rice con-
sumption in Chhattisgarh with changes in border districts, 
border states, and the rest of India. This helps to rule out the 
possibility that the changes we observe in Chhattisgarh are 
Table 2: Number of Households Sampled by Comparison Region
 Chhattisgarh Border Border Border Rest of 
  Districtsa Districts Statesc Indiad
   (No Reformsb)  
1999-2000 (55th round) 2,292 3,316 898 47,340 1,13,711
2004-05 (61st round) 2,796 3,994 1,186 49,016 1,16,939
2009-10 (66th round) 2,232 3,295 832 39,365 95,328
The observations for Chhattisgarh in the 55th round represent the number of observations 
in the districts that would later become Chhattisgarh. 
(a) The districts that border Chhattisgarh are as follows. From Andhra Pradesh: Karimnagar, 
Khammam, Warangal; from Jharkhand – Garhwa, Gumla, Simdega. From Madhya 
Pradesh: Anuppur, Balaghat, Dindori, Shahdol, Sidhi, Singrauli. From Maharashtra: 
Bhandara, Chandrapur. From Odisha: Bargarh, Jharsuguda, Kalahandi, Koraput, Malkangiri, 
Nabarangpur, Naupada, Sundargarh. From Uttar Pradesh: Sonbhadra.
(b) The districts exclude data from Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha. 
(c) Border states include Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, 
Odisha and Uttar Pradesh.
(d) The rest of India includes all households from the NSSO surveys that do not reside in 
Chhattisgarh, or in districts bordering Chhattisgarh.
Source: Consumer Expenditure Surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey 
Organisation in 1999-2000 (55th round), 2004-05 (61st round), and 2009-10 (66th round).
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Table 4: PDS Rice Utilisation and Calories
 1999-2000 2004 2009-10 Diff 1: Diff 2: Diff 1:
    C(3)-C(1) C(2)-C(1) C(3)-C(2)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PDS Rice Utilisation: 
 Chhattisgarh .100 .194 .430 .330*** .094 .236***
 (.006) (.046) (.028) (.025) (.057) (.057)
 Border districts .255 .089 .300 .041 -.166*** .207***
 (no reforms) (.015) (.012) (.016) (.034) (.045) (.027)
 Border districts .342 .251 .466 .124*** -.091*** .216***
 (.008) (.010) (.048) (.031) (.031) (.026)
 Border states .223 .183 .311 .088*** -.040*** .123***
 (.016) (.016) (.018) (.012) (.011) (.010)
 Rest of India .275 .202 .316 .041*** -.073*** .114***
 (.014) (.012) (.016) (.001) (.008) (.008)
PDS Rice Cal:
 Chhattisgarh 153.7 772.4 1,505.9 1,352.2*** 618.7*** 733.5***
 (14.7) (51.1) (87.4) (77.9) (40.9) (175.7)
 Border districts 172.9 160.1 625.9 452.9*** -12.8 465.8***
 (no reforms) (19.7) (25.6) (36.6) (104.2) (52.5) (59.6)
 Border districts 519.6 511.6 1,023.5 503.9*** 7.99 511.9***
 (90.7) (22.1) (103.7) (70.7) (68.8) (91.0)
 Border states 307.8 347.6 630.1 322.3*** 39.8* 285.4***
 (30.5) (33.1) (44.1) (36.4) (23.8) (30.2)
 Rest of India 579.5 487.4 709.0 129.5*** -92.1*** 221.6***
 (56.2) (42.2) (53.6) (43.4) (31.6) (29.0)
Column (2) reports households surveyed in 2004 from the 61st round. Standard errors 
clustered by district are presented in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported for the 
differences, with ***/**/* denoting statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
Source: The 55th, 61st, and 66th rounds of the Consumer Expenditure Surveys conducted 
by the NSSO.
due to common, regional, or national patterns. We also utilise 
border districts in states that did not implement any major PDS 
reforms from 1999-2000 to 2009-10 (Khera 2011a).9 The 
choice of border districts as a comparison region assumes that 
absent the reforms, the forces driving PDS rice consumption 
are similar across state boundaries. Table 2 (p 76) summarises 
the number of households by comparison region in each survey.
In the main text, we present our analysis in terms of simple 
means. None of the fi ndings we present qualitatively changes 
when we condition our estimates on household characteristics 
available in the NSSO survey and district fi xed effects. House-
holds characteristics include monthly per capita expenditure, 
urban/rural location, meals consumed outside the household, 
self-employment, whether a household receives any public 
benefi t besides PDS foodgrain, religion, and caste (scheduled 
caste, scheduled tribe, or Other Backward Class). We discuss 
estimation issues that arise from stratifi ed sampling in the 
NSSO surveys, omitted household determinants of PDS con-
sumption, and heterogeneity in the effect of PDS reforms 
on households in the methodology section contained in the 
Appendix (p 81). Table 3 demonstrates that in 1999-2000, 
households in Chhattisgarh and in border districts were virtu-
ally identical across each of these household characteristics. 
Table 3 provides strong evidence for our research design.
PDS Rice Consumption in Chhattisgarh
Households in Chhattisgarh increased their consumption of 
PDS rice dramatically between 1999-2000 and 2009-10. This 
increase is substantial relative to border districts, border 
states, and the rest of India. Columns (1), (3) and (4) of Table 4 
illustrate these changes.
Three features of the data stand out.10 First, in 1999-2000, 
PDS Rice Utilisation (.100) and PDS Rice Calories (153.7) in dis-
tricts that later became Chhattisgarh were far lower than in 
any comparison region.11 This is despite the fact that house-
holds in Chhattisgarh are nearly identical to those in border 
districts along all observable characteristics in Table 3.  Second, 
both PDS Rice Utilisation and PDS Rice Calories increased 
substantially in Chhattisgarh over this time period. From 
1999-2000 to 2009-10, PDS Rice Utilisation increased from .10 
to .33, and PDS Rice Calories rose by about 1,200. By 2009-10, 
Chhattisgarh had caught up with border districts and over-
taken the rest of India.
Third, these changes in Chhattisgarh are much larger than 
the changes in all compari-
son regions over this same 
period. PDS Rice Utilisation 
increased by .289 more in 
Chhattisgarh than in border 
districts (.33 less .041) that 
undertook no major PDS re-
forms over this period. PDS 
Rice Calories rose by 899.3 
more in Chhattisgarh than 
in the same border districts 
(1,352.2 less 452.9). These 
patterns do not change 
when comparing the growth 
in Chhattisgarh to the other 
comparison regions. 
These fi gures are consist-
ent with the explanation 
that the overall reform proc-
ess in Chhattisgarh had a large and positive effect on PDS rice 
consumption. Although we cannot separate PDS rice consump-
tion by district prior to 1999, we fi nd no difference in the 
growth of PDS rice consumption for households in Madhya 
Pradesh – out of which Chhattisgarh was formed – relative to 
Table 3: Household Characteristics in Chhattisgarh and Border Districts Prior to the PDS Reforms
 Chhattisgarh Border Districts Diff: 
 1999-2000  1999-2000  C(1) – C(2)
 (1) (2) (3)
Share of grains in overall calories 0.757(0.003) 0.747(0.002) 0.011(0.013)
Ln (number of meals consumed out of home) 0.591(0.028) 0.598(0.022) -0.006(0.118)
Ln (monthly per capita expenditure) 6.12(0.012) 6.12(0.011) 0.002(0.067)
Share of households consuming other PDS commodities (kerosene or sugar) 0.799(0.008) 0.744(0.008) 0.055(0.037)
Share of households that are self-employed 0.147(0.007) 0.152(0.006) -0.005(0.013)
Share of households that are rural 0.707(0.010) 0.701(0.008) 0.006(0.053)
Share of households that belong to a scheduled caste 0.139(0.007) 0.154(0.006) -0.015(0.027)
Share of households that belong to a scheduled tribe 0.263(0.009) 0.274(0.008) -0.010(0.074)
Share of households that are Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, or Jain 0.955(0.004) 0.935(0.004) 0.019(0.015)
Share of households that are Muslim 0.028(0.003) 0.032(0.003) -0.004(0.009)
Share of households that are Christian 0.017(0.003) 0.033(0.003) -0.016(0.016)
Observations 2292 3316 -
This table reports summary statistics of household characteristics in the 1999-2000 NSSO Consumer Expenditure Survey, which are used as 
control variables in the extended empirical analysis. Column (1) reports average characteristics in Chhattisgarh; column (2) reports average 
characteristics in border districts; and column (3) reports the difference between the two regions. Standard errors clustered by district are 
presented in parentheses. 
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey conducted by the NSSO in 1999-2000 (55th round).
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households in border states from 1993-94 to 1999-2000.12 Since 
PDS rice consumption also grew in Chhattisgarh relative to border 
districts (excluding Madhya Pradesh) from 1999-2000 to 2009-
10, it is unlikely that our results are an artifact of differing prior 
trends across Chhattisgarh and border regions. 
Decomposing PDS Consumption Growth 
This broad increase in PDS rice consumption in Chhattisgarh 
masks two important patterns in the data. First, the increase 
in PDS rice consumption in Chhattisgarh, in both absolute and 
relative terms, began prior to the Raman Singh government’s 
major reforms. These reforms in particular have been credited 
with improving PDS access in Chhattisgarh (Puri 2012). Col-
umn (2) of Table 4 presents the average PDS consumption for 
the 1,394 households in Chhattisgarh surveyed in 2004 – prior 
to these reforms – as part of the 61st round.13, 14 From 1999-
2000 to 2004, PDS Rice Utilisation in Chhattisgarh increased 
by .094 (a 94% increase), and PDS Rice Calories increased by 
618.7 (an over 500% increase).15 These represent 28% and 46%, 
respectively, of the total increase in PDS Rice Utilisation and 
PDS Rice Calories in Chhattisgarh from 1999-2000 to 2009-10. 
The increase in Chhattisgarh is ever larger relative to the 
change in PDS rice consumption in all comparison regions. 
From 1999-2000 to 2004, PDS Rice Utilisation actually fell in 
all comparison regions, and PDS Rice Calories were roughly 
constant.16 As a result, relative to border districts in states that 
undertook no major reforms, about 90% of the increase in PDS 
Rice Utilisation (.260/.289) and about 70% of the increase in 
PDS Rice Calories (631.5/899.3) in Chhattisgarh from 1999-
2000 to 2009-10 took place before 2004.
Second, after the reforms of 2004, the increase in PDS rice 
consumption in Chhattisgarh is not substantially different 
from the increase in comparison regions. PDS Rice Utilisation 
in Chhattisgarh rose from .194 to .430 from 2004 to 2009-10, 
but it increased from .089 to .300 in border districts that 
u ndertook no major PDS reforms over the same time period. 
The increase in Chhattisgarh is not statistically different from 
the contemporaneous increase in these border districts.17 A 
similar pattern holds for PDS Rice Calories. The increase in 
Chhattisgarh from 2004 to 2009-10 (733.5) is larger in magni-
tude than the increase in border districts that undertook no 
major PDS reforms (465.8). As a result, the raw increase in 
Chhattisgarh (733.5) substantially overstates the effect attrib-
utable to the post-2004 reforms. At most 36% of the increase in 
PDS Rice Calories in Chhattisgarh over this period can be at-
tributed to the Raman Singh government’s post-2004 reforms. 
A common pattern of PDS growth in Chhattisgarh and bor-
der districts after 2004 suggests the presence of regional forces 
that were distinct from Chhattisgarh’s particular reforms. For 
example, the states of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh 
and Odisha implemented reforms that decreased the price of 
PDS foodgrains between 2004-05 and 2009-10 (Khera 2011a). 
Column (6) of Table 4 shows that the growth in PDS rice con-
sumption of households in border districts from these states 
and households in border districts of states that did not imple-
ment reforms (Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh) 
were nearly identical. It is also likely that the rise in the market 
price of rice across the entire country and the global fi nancial 
crisis were responsible for part of the common increase in PDS 
rice consumption from 2004 to 2010. 
The pre-existing upward trend in Chhattisgarh suggests 
that the pre-2004 reforms and other social and political factors 
continued to play a role in the growth of PDS rice consumption 
after 2004. These factors would have operated in conjunction 
with changes to the PDS from 2004 to 2009-10. In their 
a bsence, it is possible that Chhattisgarh would not have 
w itnessed such a large increase in PDS consumption. Taken 
t ogether, these fi ndings present a cautionary tale for the NFSA, 
and for states seeking to duplicate Chhattisgarh’s success by 
adopting similar reforms. 
A Second Look at PDS Rice Consumption Prior to 2004
We have suggested that the increase in PDS rice consumption 
in Chhattisgarh prior to 2004 was a result of the expansion of 
FPSs and state-level procurement. Given the available data, it 
is diffi cult to precisely identify the forces behind this increase. 
Nevertheless, we are able to test two plausible alternative 
h ypotheses. First, the PDS could be easier to operate in a 
smaller and newer state. For example, transaction costs and 
monitoring costs might be lower in a smaller state. There may 
be fewer entrenched interests to resist policy changes. We test 
this hypothesis by examining PDS rice consumption in two 
new states – Jharkhand and Uttarakhand – from 1999-2000 to 
2004 (Table 5). We fi nd no comparable growth in Jharkhand 
or Uttarakhand in either PDS Rice Utilisation or in PDS Rice 
Calories. This fi nding does not change if we examine PDS con-
sumption growth in each state relative to districts that border 
the state. We conclude that the formation of a new state is an 
unlikely explanation for PDS rice consumption growth in 
Chhattisgarh over this period. 
Second, some of the increase in PDS rice consumption in 
Chhattisgarh from 1999-2000 (55th round) to 2004 (61st 
round) could have been caused by other actions taken by the 
Raman Singh government . The Raman Singh government, 
which took power in December 2003, identifi ed improving the 
PDS as a policy priority. This focus on the PDS might have 
improved the operation of the existing system d uring 2004, 
even before the passage of reforms. For example, some of the 
reforms formalised in the PDS (Control) Order 2004 were 
Table 5: PDS Consumption in Newly Formed States
 1999-2000 2004 Diff: C(2)–C(1) Obs
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
PDS Rice Utilisation: 
 Chhattisgarh .100(.013) .194(.046) .094(.057) 3,685
 Jharkhand .066(.014) .019(.003) -.047***(.013) 4,586
 Uttarakhand .312(.081) .170(.01) -.142*(.055) 1,877
PDS Rice Cal:
 Chhattisgarh 153.7(14.7) 772.4(135.9) 618.7***(40.9) 3,685
 Jharkhand 52.8(11.5) 35.1(6.96) -17.7(11.9) 4,586
 Uttarakhand 770.7(240.6) 477.2(37.2) -293.5(175.4) 1,877
Column (2) reports households surveyed in 2004 from the 61st round. Standard errors 
clustered by district are presented in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported for the 
differences, with ***/**/* denoting statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Source: The 55th and 61st rounds of the Consumer Expenditure Surveys conducted by the NSSO.
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tested as pilot programmes prior to the promulgation of the 
Order in December 2004.18 Dreze and Khera (2010) suggest 
that, 
Ultimately…it is political will that seems to matter most. Somehow, 
the PDS became a political priority in Chhattisgarh and a decision was 
made to turn it around. When political bosses fi rmly direct the 
b ureaucracy to fi x a dysfunctional system, things begin to change (p 1). 
We further investigate the timing of PDS consumption 
growth in Chhattisgarh to determine whether this explanation 
might account for the pre-2004 growth. Specifi cally, we 
present estimates of PDS consumption growth from all NSSO 
“thin rounds” in our possession between 1999-2000 and 2004-05 
in Table 6. These comprise the 2000-01 survey (56th round) 
and the 2003 survey (59th round). The two surveys differ 
from the “thick rounds” in terms of how they stratify house-
holds by income and by rural/urban status. This makes it dif-
fi cult to interpret simple differences in averages between the 
two types of rounds. However, comparing the changes bet-
ween the two types of surveys in Chhattisgarh to changes in 
comparison regions helps to limit this concern. Our results are 
similar when we compare PDS rice consumption by rural/urban 
and income strata separately, and when we condition on 
household characteristics.19 
The results presented in Table 6 suggest that PDS rice con-
sumption grew in Chhattisgarh relative to all comparison 
r egions prior to the election of the Raman Singh government. 
There was an absolute increase in PDS Rice Calories in Chhattis-
garh between 1999-2000 and 2000-01, and between 1999-2000 
and 2003. This increase contrasts with the decrease in PDS rice 
calories consumed in each comparison region over both time 
periods. Although the magnitude of the decrease in compari-
son regions is likely a result of sampling differences between 
the surveys, the difference with respect to Chhattisgarh is still 
instructive.20 PDS Rice Utilisation remained roughly constant 
across each time period in Chhattisgarh. However, this lack of 
change is again in contrast to the large decreases in each com-
parison region between each time period.
Disruptions to PDS Access during the Reforms
Finally, we provide evidence that the PDS (Control) Order of 
2004 may have temporarily disrupted PDS availability in Chhat-
tisgarh. The Order discontinued the FPS licences of private deal-
ers and provided a short timeline for the transfer of ownership to 
gram panchayats or other local groups. However, the Order 
could not be implemented until the resolution of a Supreme 
Court case in 2005 (Patnaik 2005). During this time period, pri-
vate dealers may have exited the market, resulting in a tempo-
rary disruption of PDS access to households in Chhattisgarh. 
We investigate this concern by utilising the 2004-05 Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey conducted by the NSSO. The fi rst 
half of the survey was conducted prior to the PDS (Control) 
Order, while the second half was conducted immediately after 
the Order, but before the transfer of FPSs to local groups could 
take place. The results in Table 7 are consistent with a tempo-
rary disruption in the availability of PDS rice immediately 
after the reform. PDS Rice Utilisation fell by .046 and PDS Rice 
Calories fell by 264. In contrast, these fi gures were roughly 
constant in all comparison regions. 
Although PDS consumption more than rebounded in Chhattis-
garh by 2009-10, this short-term pattern is consistent with diffi -
culties in implementing the PDS reforms. If even Chhattisgarh, 
which had the political will to initiate and implement reforms on 
its own, experienced a short-run fall in PDS consumption in this 
process, then we might expect this fall to be of greater size and 
duration in states that lack such will, but adopt similar reforms. 
These fi ndings suggest that states reforming their distribution of 
PDS foodgrain should pay particular attention to securing the 
availability of rations during the transition period. 
Conclusions
Several important patterns emerge from this study of PDS con-
sumption growth in Chhattisgarh and comparison regions, all 
of which have implications for current reform efforts. First, 
PDS rice consumption by households in Chhattisgarh grew 
substantially from 1999-2000 to 2009-10, relative to districts 
Table 6: PDS Consumption between Thick Rounds
 1999-2000 2000-01 2003 Diff 1: Diff 2:
    C(2)–C(1) C(3)–C(1)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PDS Rice Utilisation: 
 Chhattisgarh .100 .152 .087 .052* -.013
 (.006) (.018) (.013) (.020) (.022)
 Border districts .342 .230 .159 -.112*** -.183***
 (.008) (.031) (.028) (.023) (.030)
 Border states .223 .123 .113 -.100*** -.110***
 (.016) (015) (.012) (.010) (.009)
 Rest of India .275 .147 .114 -.128*** -.161***
 (.014) (.011) (.010) (.008) (.010)
PDS Rice Cal:
 Chhattisgarh 153.7 330.2 447.3 176.5*** 293.6**
 (14.7) (51.7) (109.4) (52.0) (103.6)
 Border districts 519.6 388.4 347.9 -131.2** -171.7**
 (90.7) (61.6) (56.3) (49.5) (66.0)
 Border states 307.8 200.3 296.1 -107.5*** -11.7
 (30.5) (27.3) (78.1) (17.9) (76.8)
 Rest of India 579.5 305.9 337.4 -274.5*** -242.9***
 (56.2) (33.2) (50.1) (34.3) (46.1)
Standard errors clustered by district are presented in parentheses. Statistical significance 
is reported for the differences, with ***/**/* denoting statistical significance at the 
1%/5%/10% level. 
Source: The 55th, 56th, and 59th rounds of the Consumer Expenditure Surveys conducted 
by the NSSO.
Table 7: PDS Consumption Immediately before and after the 2004 PDS Reform 
  2004 2005 Diff: C(2)–C(1)
  (1) (2) (3)
PDS Rice Utilisation: 
 Chhattisgarh .194(.046) .148(.031) -.046*(.022)
 Border districts .251(.010) .262(.040) .011(.021)
 Border states .183(.016) .188(.016) .005(.005)
 Rest of India .202(.012) .215(.014) .013***(.004)
PDS Rice Cal:
 Chhattisgarh 772.4(51.1) 508.4(100.3) -264.0***(60.8)
 Border districts 511.6(22.1) 534.3(79.9) 22.7(56.3)
 Border states 347.6(33.1) 344.8(31.0) -2.87(12.3)
 Rest of India 487.4(42.2) 530.6(49.5) 43.2**(16.6)
Columns (1) and (2) report households surveyed in 2004 and those surveyed in 2005, 
respectively, from the 61st round. Standard errors clustered by district are presented in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is reported for the differences, with ***/**/* denoting 
statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
Source: The 61st round of the Consumer Expenditure Survey conducted by the NSSO.
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bordering Chhattisgarh in states that undertook no compara-
ble PDS reforms. Excluding PDS rice consumption, the observ-
able characteristics of households in these districts are nearly 
identical – both economically and statistically – to those in 
Chhattisgarh in 1999-2000. This fi nding suggests that com-
prehensive and sustained reforms, when coupled with politi-
cal will and civil society effort, can improve PDS access. The 
increase in PDS rice consumption in Chhattisgarh also pro-
vides an opportunity to analyse further the effects of in-kind 
food aid on food i nsecurity and malnutrition (Krishnamurthy 
et al 2013).21 
Second, about 40% of the increase in PDS rice consumption 
in Chhattisgarh from 1999-2000 to 2009-10 took place before 
the major reforms of the Raman Singh government began in 
2004. This magnitude is even larger when viewed in compari-
son to border districts, which experienced little change in PDS 
rice consumption between 1999-2000 and 2004. The increase 
in Chhattisgarh is not shared by smaller, newly-formed states 
such as Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. Neither can it be ex-
plained by unobserved administrative actions taken by the 
Singh-led government after coming to power in late 2003. We 
suggest that the expansion of FPSs and state procurement of 
PDS rice by the Ajit Jogi government may have contributed to 
this growth. 
Third, while PDS rice consumption grew in Chhattisgarh 
a fter 2004 (Khera 2011a, 2011b; Puri 2012), it grew by a similar 
amount in districts that border Chhattisgarh in states that 
u ndertook no major PDS reforms. At most one-third of the PDS 
consumption growth in Chhattisgarh after 2004 can be attrib-
uted to the Raman Singh government’s major reforms. This 
fi nding does not imply that these reforms had no effect, but it 
underlines the diffi culty of distinguishing this effect from 
broader trends, previous reforms, and the political and social 
will to improve the PDS. 
Fourth, there was a temporary fall in PDS rice consumption 
in Chhattisgarh of about one-third immediately following the 
2004 PDS (Control) Order, which discontinued private FPS 
l icences. In contrast, there was no comparable change in 
border districts, border states, or the rest of India over this 
time p eriod. This fi nding suggests that policymakers contem-
plating analogous changes to PDS distribution should think 
carefully about the availability of PDS rations during the 
transition period.
These fi ndings indicate that the increase in PDS consump-
tion in Chhattisgarh was driven by multiple factors. The ma-
jor reforms undertaken by the Raman Singh government 
starting in 2004 may have played a role, but so did earlier re-
forms by the Ajit Jogi government, diffuse political and social 
factors that were likely present prior to 2004, and post-2004 
regional and national trends. These fi ndings advise caution in 
extra polating Chhattisgarh’s experience to other reforms at 
the state or central level. Chhattisgarh’s experience provides 
some empirical support for the claim that the NFSA can in-
crease PDS consumption, but it also implies that such in-
creases might not be substantial or sustained in the absence 
of comparable political and social effort. 
Notes
 1 Due to the attention they have received in aca-
demic and policy discussions, we refer to these 
provisions as the “major reforms” of the Raman 
Singh government.
 2 Chhattisgarh began to implement the Antyo-
daya Anna Yojana (AAY) scheme in 2001. The 
AAY scheme required states to identify the 
poorest of BPL households and supply them 
with AAY cards entitling them to a larger ra-
tion at a lower price. This quantity started at 25 
kg rice at Rs 3 per kg in 2000, and was raised to 
35 kg in 2002. However, AAY families only con-
stitute 3% of our sample in Chhattisgarh and 
border districts for years in which ration-card 
ownership is available. Therefore, our results 
are not an artefact of early AAY implementa-
tion in Chhattisgarh. 
 3 A search of news stories in The Times of India 
and The Hindu from 1998-2005 revealed no 
e vidence of large-scale reforms in neighbour-
ing states.
 4 The Annual Report of the Ministry of Consum-
er Affairs, Food, and Public Distribution re-
ports very little change in PDS rice procured by 
the FCI from either Chhattisgarh or any border 
state during this time period.
 5 Chhattisgarh’s PDS reforms continue to evolve. 
Chhattisgarh recently passed the 2012 Food Se-
curity Act, which further expands PDS eligibil-
ity and increases the level of rations.
 6 In Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, the 
quantity of the ration was reduced to help off-
set the additional cost. Jharkhand also reduced 
the price of PDS commodities below the central 
issue price, but did so after the time period 
u nder analysis. 
 7 We calculate the calories consumed from PDS 
foodgrains by multiplying total kilograms 
consumed by the average calories per kilo-
gram in the Nutritive Values of Indian Foods 
(Gopalan et al 1989).
 8 Estimates for PDS wheat utilisation and wheat 
calories are available from the authors on re-
quest. These estimates are smaller in magnitude 
than those for rice, but convey a similar pattern. 
 9 These results are robust to the use of other 
comparison regions. In particular, the results 
are robust to using Madhya Pradesh as the 
comparison region.
10 The mean differences discussed below continue 
to be economically and statistically signifi cant 
when we condition on household characteristics 
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available in the NSSO survey, and district fi xed 
effects. These results are available from the au-
thors on request. 
11  Each of these differences is statistically signifi -
cant at the 1% level. Although we do not report 
the associated standard error of the difference-
in-differences estimates comparing the in-
creases in PDS consumption in Chhattisgarh to 
comparison regions, all differences highlight-
ed in the main text are either statistically sig-
nifi cant, or at least border on conventional lev-
els, in these simple estimates. They are all sta-
tistically signifi cant in more complete specifi -
cations. These results are available from the 
authors upon request.
12 These results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
13 The survey was conducted between June 2004 
and June 2005. The survey sample was nearly 
identical in each time period. It included nearly 
identical numbers of households from each in-
come and sector strata in each district in both 
2004 and 2005. This was likely done to avoid 
seasonality effects in sampling. 
14 When using the entire sample of the 2004-05 
survey, there is still a large increase in PDS rice 
consumption relative to 1999-2000.
15  Although the change in the share of house-
holds consuming any PDS rice only borders 
conventional levels of statistical signifi cance, 
the estimate becomes much more precise when 
adding control variables and fi xed effects to 
help absorb omitted factors. 
16 Both the growth in the share of households 
consuming PDS rice and growth in the number 
of calories obtained from PDS rice in Chhattis-
garh are statistically different from the growth 
in border districts and the rest of India at the 
1% level. 
17  The increase in Chhattisgarh is not statistically 
different from the increase in border districts, 
even when we condition on household charac-
teristics and district fi xed effects.
18 For example, private licences to run PDS shops 
were rescinded in a few districts prior to the 
abolishment of private participation in the PDS 
(Control) Order 2004.
19 These results are available from the authors 
upon request.
20 Much of the decrease between the 1999-2000 
survey and the “thin rounds” for border districts 
disappears when using the 2004-05 survey, 
which uses the same sampling methodo logy as 
the 1999-2000 survey.
21 We fi nd that non-grains consumption signifi -
cantly increases in Chhattisgarh relative to 
comparison regions as the availability of PDS 
rice expands (Krishnamurthy et al 2013). 
These results contrast with previous esti-
mates, which suggest that food price subsidies 
do not necessarily affect nutritional outcomes 
(Jensen and Miller 2011; Kochar 2005; Tarozzi 
2005). 
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Appendix: Methodological Issues
There are a number of issues that arise as a 
result of data limitations and our empirical 
strategy. First, we rely on surveys of actual 
PDS consumption, rather than purchases. 
This poses an issue if households over- or 
under-report, or change their actual usage of 
PDS rice in a way that is systematically asso-
ciated with the timing of reforms in Chhat-
tisgarh. However, there is no compelling ex-
planation for why these factors would change 
only in Chhattisgarh, and not in bordering 
districts. Moreover, all other studies using 
NSSO consumption data are forced to rely on 
similar measures (Deaton and Dreze 2009; 
NSSO 2007).
Second, although our units of treatment are 
districts, we do not have access to a random 
sample of households within each district. The 
NSSO consumer expenditure surveys are strat-
ifi ed by whether a household resides in a rural 
or urban area, and further stratifi ed by relative 
affl uence. We are therefore unable to construct 
population estimates of PDS rice consumption 
for districts that would later form the state of 
Chhattisgarh, or for border districts in any of 
the rounds. 
This limitation does not invalidate our re-
search design because our goal is to detect 
changes in PDS rice consumption over time. 
What matters for the comparison of uncondi-
tional means – the simplest difference-in-dif-
ferences estimator – are changes in the sam-
pling procedure over time. For the 55th round, 
the relative size of the rural/urban sample 
was determined by the share of the popula-
tion that was rural in the 1991 Census. For the 
61st and 66th rounds, it was determined by the 
2001 Census. Therefore, differential trends in 
the growth of urban areas could drive differ-
ences in average PDS consumption across a 
pooled sample of rural and urban households. 
The stratifi cation on relative affl uence is also 
slightly different between the 55th round, and 
the other two rounds.
These differences in sampling, however, do 
not present a problem for our research design 
because they are based on characteristics that 
are observable in our data. By conditioning on 
these characteristics, we are able to estimate 
an average change in PDS rice consumption in 
Chhattisgarh, relative to comparison regions. 
All results presented above are qualitatively 
identical in these more complete specifi ca-
tions (these results are available from the authors 
upon request). Moreover, all results are qualita-
tively identical when we restrict the sample to 
r ural areas, urban areas, or any second-stage 
strata within which there is random sampling 
of households (that is, non-affl uent/affl uent 
households in rural/urban areas). For simplic-
ity, we present means for the pooled sample 
(these results are available from the authors upon 
request). 
Third, we estimate PDS rice consumption 
separately for households surveyed in 2004 
and 2005 as part of the 61st round. The survey 
was conducted between June 2004 and June 
2005, and the sample was nearly identical in 
each time period, probably to avoid seasonality 
effects in sampling. It surveyed nearly identi-
cal numbers of households from each income 
and sector strata in each district in both 2004 
and 2005. This fact, along with the difference-
in-differences design that evaluates changes in 
Chhattisgarh relative to comparison regions, 
limit concerns that our results are confounded 
by sampling issues. 
